Out comment

We must holistically analyze the methods employed by the government, which led to a logical “improvement” of almost 10% (an additional 192,049 votes) over Georgian Dream’s previous parliamentary election results. Taken together, these facts and their overall impact make one thing clear: these elections were neither free nor fair.

Diminishing the opposition's role in the activities of the Central Election Commission (CEC)

The CEC is composed of 17 members, including 8 professional members elected by Parliament at different times with the support of the ruling party. Additionally, the ruling party has 1 party representative in the commission. Thus, the majority of the CEC is selected to the Georgian Dream’s liking. Until recently, under the previous rule, a two-thirds majority was required for this institution to make significant decisions (for example, appointing professional members to district election commissions). In July, Parliament changed this rule, enabling decisions to be made by a simple majority. This amendment effectively brought the CEC under the influence of a single party.

Regulations for forming precinct election commissions

The CEC introduced a new rule prior to these elections: the distribution of responsibilities among district commission members must take place at least 7 days before voting day. Previously, this was done before the voting process began. This advance knowledge of commission members’ identities allowed the government to pressure or intimidate them. These concerns are supported by the evidence (  presented on election day, which highlights various violations committed by commission members responsible for regulating the voters’ flow and registrars (such as allowing a voter to vote with someone else’s ID card, suppressing the voice that detects a violation in the verification machines, violating marking rules, and more). It was clear that some district commission members were acting in the government’s favor.

Opening polling stations abroad

In 2024, 67 polling stations were set up in 53 cities across 42 countries, accommodating up to 96,000 voters. Prior to elections, emigrants in several major cities abroad held demonstrations advocating for the establishment of additional polling stations. When approving these districts, opposition members of the CEC requested opening additional polling stations in 10 cities where the number of emigrants with consular registration exceeded 50. A monitoring organization also referred to the court with this claim, which was ultimately denied.

Blurring the line between the state and the party

All ruling parties inherently have an advantage in elections, as the government can showcase reforms that its opponents can only promise to voters. However, the practices established by the “Georgian Dream” far exceeded acceptable limits. The evidence of this tendency is the completion of infrastructure projects initiated long ago right before the elections. Voters perceive this not as an achievement of the government, but rather of the party, which leads to the blurring of the line between the state and the party, an event that disrupts a fair electoral environment.

In addition, shortly before the elections, central and local government bodies approved various social and economic programs for more than 10 categories of beneficiaries, and a paid internship program in public institutions was also announced, providing employment opportunities to up to 3,000 young people. In September, the parliament adopted an amnesty law that included about 13,000 people.

The timing of these governance measures indicates the government's intention to indirectly bribe the electorate (beneficiary and his family members) and gain their support in return for specific benefits.

Pressure and intimidation

The facts of pressure and intimidation on voters prior to the election were also revealed. These involved tying the retention or loss of employment and social benefits for public sector workers and those on the socially vulnerable list to their voting preferences.

The ruling party also used these people in pre-election campaigns. They massively participated in the demonstrations organized by “Georgian Dream” and were actively expressing their support for the party on social networks.

More than 320 thousand people are employed in budgetary institutions, and up to 700 thousand people receive subsistence allowance. Effective pressure on these people, which is not a difficult task for the government considering their vulnerability, is a effective means of mobilizing votes and a mechanism for gaining a significant advantage over the opposition.

Bribery

Facts of alleged voter bribery (money being given to voters) were also revealed (for example, on Election Day, one of the monitoring organizations identified such incidents around 13% of precincts), where money was exchanged to voter attendance/non-attendance or the transfer of their ID cards.

Controlling the will of the voters

A new mechanism for pressuring voters was introduced – the so-called call centers. Through party-organized groups, the Georgian Dream ensured the mobilization of voters.

Another group was overseeing the arrival of voters at the polling stations, with some individuals registering citizens outside the legally defined radius of the precinct. In some instances, this was carried out by the commission members themselves, which is also unlawful.

Additionally, instances of violence and disruptions or attempts to disrupt the voting process were recorded.

Violating the secrecy of ballot

Violations of vote secrecy in these elections were especially visible in precincts with electronic vote counting machines (which covered 90% of voters). The violation of this constitutional principle was primarily caused by the fact that the ink from the special pen used by the CEC left a mark on the reverse side of the ballot during marking. As a result, when the voter placed the ballot in the machine, an interested party could determine whether the citizen had voted for the government or not. Moreover, the violations were exacerbated by the facts of several people illegally entering the polling booth at the same time. The secrecy of the vote was further compromised by cameras positioned at the ballot box, which created a sense of surveillance among voters.The commission members often did not respond to such facts.

Voting multiple times

Observers detected instances of multiple voting by a single voter, which were confirmed by repeated voting or attempts by individuals who had already been marked.

All of this was made possible by open and deliberate breaches of the law by precinct election commission members. These violations included breaking marking rules, allowing unauthorized individuals into the polling station, permitting individuals to vote with another person’s ID, and more.

Manipulations in electoral lists

Another manipulation was connected to the confiscation of identification cards and voting in place of another person. Several opposition parties urged the CEC to open its verification machines and review the lists, allowing voters to verify if someone had voted on their behalf. However, the ruling party rejected this request, citing the need to protect personal data. In fact, these lists have become inaccessible due to the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor's Office.

Based on data from approximately 300 polling stations, ISFED found that more male voters appeared on Election Day than the number indicated on the voter lists. The CEC acknowledged a technical error in only a small number of cases (150 voters), and did not provide a substantiated response to the remaining cases.

Summary

In the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Georgian Dream resorted to all types of permitted and prohibited practices to secure the most votes. It employed methods of tailoring the legislation to its own interests, breaking the law, and following wrongful practices. In particular:

• The scarcity of polling stations abroad did not correspond to the increased number of immigrants, which violated the principle of universality of elections;
• Blurring the line between the ruling party and the state, approving the amnesty law, social and other programs shortly before the elections served to influence the will of the voters and shape the choice in favor of this party;
• Effective response to the violations was hindered by the violations of the procedures directly by the members of the district commissions, as well as the facts of interfering with the activities of the observers;
• The fact that “Georgian Dream” controlled the election administration at all levels (the same applies to the court), ensured that the legal claims to respond to such violations would be unsuccessful;
• Controlling the will of the voters served to influence the choices of the citizens just a few minutes before making the selection;
• Manipulations related to electoral lists are still unidentified and uninvestigated;
• And finally - a widespread violation of secrecy. The extent of the clear and indisputable violation of this constitutional principle, even taken separately, is sufficient to invalidate the results of the elections. However, in our case, its effect on the results of the elections does not end there. The violation of secrecy has transformed the pressure on individuals employed in budgetary institutions and socially vulnerable citizens, along with voter bribery and intimidation, into a highly effective tool of coercion.

Today, in Georgia, all these manipulations, which are described in this article and which make it impossible to hold fair elections in the country, have been normalized. These elections have demonstrated that we need to fundamentally reconsider our approach to actions taken during the election campaign and on election day. Otherwise, changing the government in Georgia through elections will become impossible.