What happened on January 11?

According to eyewitnesses, during the dispersal of the protest, Mzia was standing with friends when a group of police officers approached, yelling and cursing, and began arresting peaceful citizens in a completely calm environment. In silent footage aired by the TV channel Imedi, Amaghlobeli is seen explaining something to the Head of Adjara Police, Irakli Dgebuadze. As he turns his back on her, Amaghlobeli places her hand on his jacket and then slaps him. She is immediately arrested thereafter. The silent nature of the footage leaves room for interpretation, suggesting that her action may have been preceded by circumstances that provoked the escalation of events.

What is the Prosecutor's Office accusing Mzia Amaghlobeli of?

The Prosecutor’s Office alleges that Mzia Amaghlobeli assaulted a police officer. Her conduct has been legally classified under Article 353¹ of the Georgian Criminal Code, a provision that necessitates careful legal interpretation. According to the first paragraph of this article, it is a punishable offense to attack a police officer, an employee of the Special Penitentiary Service, or another public official—or their official premises, residence, vehicle, or family member—in connection with the performance of their official duties.

In judicial practice, a central criterion for classifying an act under this provision is the perpetrator’s intent to attack the official due to or in connection with their official capacity. This intent may manifest in motives such as facilitating another crime, eliminating a witness, seeking revenge, or other related purposes (Tbilisi City Court, January 31, 2020, Case #1/3811-19). Furthermore, the conduct must constitute an "attack"—an inherently aggressive act that involves direct intent to physically assault, injure, or engage in substantially violent behavior. A necessary element for the offense to be constituted is the existence of a serious threat to legally protected interests as a result of the violent act.

Typically, the notion of an “attack” implies some degree of planning, preparation, or information gathering, a reading supported by the scope of the provision, which extends protective coverage beyond the individual officer to include their residence, vehicle, or family members. Although the possibility of a spontaneous attack is not entirely precluded, the degree of violence must, in any case, pose a serious threat to the protected legal interests to qualify as a criminal offense under this article.

The restrictive and exclusive use of the term “attack” in the Criminal Code to describe severe crimes—such as robbery, banditry, the organization of group violence, piracy, or acts of terrorism—further substantiates this interpretation. Consequently, the application of Article 353¹ to Mzia Amaghlobeli’s conduct reveals a level of legal mischaracterization so profound that it suggests the deployment of criminal law as a tool of political retribution.

Judicial practice reveals considerable shortcomings in distinguishing the elements of Article 353¹ (attack on a police officer) from those of Article 353. The latter criminalizes resistance to a police officer, a Special Penitentiary Service employee, or another public official, when aimed at obstructing the maintenance of public order, halting or altering their official functions, or compelling them—through violence or the threat of violence—to engage in an unlawful act. A key criterion under this article is resistance through violence or threats thereof, which may include attempts to evade arrest or to hinder investigative or procedural actions (Tbilisi City Court, January 31, 2020, Case #1/3811-19).

For the purposes of this provision, violence encompasses physical assault or bodily harm, whereas threats may involve both life- and health-endangering scenarios as well as less severe forms, provided they generate a reasonable fear of implementation in the official. The primary legal interest protected under this article is the lawful execution of a police officer’s duties, with the officer’s personal safety constituting a secondary protected interest (Tbilisi Appeals Court, Criminal Chamber, November 7, 2019, Case № 1b/1637-19).

Accordingly, the provision encompasses interference with a law enforcement officer’s lawful efforts to uphold public order, through the use or threat of violence. For criminal liability to be established under Article 353, two essential elements must be satisfied: the legality of the officer’s conduct and the presence of violence or its threat on the part of the citizen. These criteria must be thoroughly evaluated by the court on a case-by-case basis.

What must be considered?

Non-violent resistance to a law enforcement officer in the course of their official duties, verbal insults or other forms of degrading conduct does not constitute a criminal offense under Georgian law but rather falls within the domain of administrative infractions. The Criminal Code of Georgia predicates the culpability of violent acts on additional factors, notably the infliction of physical pain or the degree of bodily harm sustained. The least severe form of violence subject to criminal liability is codified in Article 126, which addresses battery or other violent conduct that results in physical pain without causing actual bodily injury. For conduct to fall within the ambit of this provision, the victim's subjective experience of physical pain is a necessary condition (Tbilisi Appeals Court, Criminal Chamber, Case № 1b/1616-19, January 20, 2020).

Clearly, Mzia Amaghlobeli’s slap could not have caused a level of pain to satisfy the threshold for criminal liability. The absence of demonstrable physical pain renders her actions - namely, tugging the police officer's jacket and delivering a slap—amenable to classification under the Administrative Offenses Code. This code establishes liability for acts of disobedience or insult directed at a police officer. Mzia Amaghlobeli’s action is thus based on an evidently incorrect legal qualification. Her conduct does not attain the requisite level of social danger necessary to warrant the invocation of the punitive apparatus of criminal law, which is governed by the principle of ultima ratio (last resort) in criminal law.

The legal absurdity of Mzia Amaghlobeli’s case unmistakably demonstrates the instrumentalization of criminal law for political purposes.

Author : Ani Nasrashvili